Gordon Brown Launches His War on U.K. Terror

Brown appears more committed to civil liberties than Blair. Appearances can be deceptive.

By Liam Bailey

Tony Blair's successor as British Prime Minister, Gordon Brown announced Jun. 3 his intention to strengthen counter-terrorism measures in the U.K. The third time the Labour party has done so since 9/11 and 7/7. Brown also pledged to increase parliamentary accountability to ensure civil liberties are upheld under the new laws. It remains to be seen whether Brown's rhetoric of maintaining civil liberties is anymore than a cover for more authoritarianism. As Blair's closest aide throughout most of his premiership it is likely Brown supported Blair's terror laws, which were often thought to be slowly but surely eroding civil liberties, so we could be in for more of the same.

However, whereas I thought Blair was turning the U.K. into a police state targeting Muslims and driving so called moderate Muslims into extremism, because Brown seems as eager to uphold civil liberties of the British way as he is to tighten measures to stop terrorism, I am prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt for now.

I am in support of most of Brown's ideas: the use of phone-tap evidence in court, allowing police to continue questioning terror suspects after they have been charged, and allowing judges to consider involvement in terrorist activities as an aggravating factor when adjudicating other crimes. Blair rejected the use of phone-tap evidence in court on advice from security services, who feared it would jeopardize their secretive methods for gathering intelligence. Brown plans to look into ways it can be used without revealing sources to the public.

Where I am against Browns policy is his regurgitating Blair's most controversial proposal that resulted in his first parliamentary defeat, extending the period of without charge detention from 28 to 90 days.

28 days detention without charge is as long as anywhere else in the free world. According to human rights groups any longer is tantamount to internment. It is claimed that the 90 day detention is needed in light of how technology can hide evidence of terrorist activities, i.e. to gain access to encrypted hard-drives and data storage devices etc. But British law states innocent until proven guilty, so, until any evidence is retrieved proving they are guilty of something, these prisoners are innocent and should be tagged and released after 28 days and their hard-ware kept.

A tag is linked to a satellite system and alerts authorities if you aren't in or around your home for a certain time every day. That way if or when the data is recovered the people could be re-arrested. 90 days detention without charge is too likely to be abused.

When Blair was defeated on the 90 day proposal, it was opposed by the Liberal Democrats, Conservatives and some Labour back-benchers. Constitutional Affairs Minister and deputy Labour leadership candidate Harriet Harman thinks that this time it will be different, that the house will support Brown's measures -- including 90 days detention -- if Brown can make a good case that the measures are necessary. She said on BBC One's Sunday AM:

"I don't think there will be a huge problem if there is a proper debate about it -- if evidence is brought forward about why current powers are inadequate and what the safeguards will be." Her sentiments of support for the new proposals were echoed by the other deputy leadership candidates, Hilary Benn, Hazel Blears and Peter Hain.

Conservative sources say there is no new evidence to support the need for longer detention. Liberal Democrat Justice Spokesman Simon Hughes warned Mr Brown that he will have a fight on his hands if he attempts to increase detention without charge period for terror suspects. In an attempt to sweeten the proposal Mr Brown has insisted he will ensure a judicial review of extended detentions is undertaken every 7 days. It is difficult to predict whether that will counteract the level of opposition to the plan.

Apparently Brown is to put the phone-tap proposal to the cross-party Privy Council for discussion, which is honouring his pledge to make the government more open and accountable on its new course. Lord Carlisle, the government's independent reviewer of anti-terrorism legislation welcomed Brown's proposals, saying:

"I do think it is time for the political parties to get together and to try to reach a consensus with the government, so we can move forward on terrorism legislation on the basis of fitness for purpose, rather than having a hot political debate about these desperately difficult and important matters."

What detracts from this is the fact that Brown first released word of his proposals to the Sunday papers instead of the House of Commons. And just five days before Home Secretary John Reid was due to present his terrorism measures to the house, throwing any idea of even party consensus on dealing with the terror threat out the window -- let alone cross-party consensus. This also suggested Brown does intend to be authoritarian in his leadership and his terrorism measures -- it's my way or no way.

The new proposals are in response to three terror suspects who had been issued control orders under the old legislation absconding. However I feel suggesting 90 days detention is necessary because of that is like sending a bear to catch a mouse. I see no reason why the tags I spoke of above can't be used to strengthen existing control orders. Brown's leap to Blair's 90 day detention plan backs-up claims that he was staunchly behind Blair's legislation and the absconders simply gave him the leverage to revive the defeated proposal.

So, overall Brown's latest release was much like his vision for his premiership when Blair steps down, the new measures for terrorism are different than Blair's in slight ways, but on the whole I'd say we can expect more of the same.

Pacifying Somalia: United in Extremism

The War on Terror is preventing security in Somalia

By Liam Bailey

When they took on the Transitional Federal Government and won control of most of southern and central Somalia last year, the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) did something that many before them had tried and failed. They brought peace and security from complete chaos and almost constant violence in areas under their control in southern and central Somalia after July 2006. For the first time in fifteen years children could go to school safely and hospital's could treat the sick instead of wounded. And with no gunmen on the streets to charge truck drivers fees for safe passage food prices dropped.

The previous 15 years of violence had filled a power vacuum left by the ousting of Dictator Siad Barre, as Somalia's many warlords, clans and sub-clans vied for a bigger piece of the pie. The Islamic Courts within the union that were predominant in their sweep to power followed Salafism, a hard-line strain of Islam widely associated with extremism and terrorism.

Thus the UIC became another target in the War on Terror, and they were ousted by Ethiopia at the bequest of the U.S. Of course the TFG played their part, too. When they beat a hasty retreat, peace and security for Somalis went with them. In view of Somalia's history of inter-clan violence an extreme faith in the country's religion is perhaps needed to supersede the tribal traditions of warlord rule.

The current violence is a good example of this. On the surface it is a UIC insurgency waging the holy war they promised against the Transitional Federal Government (TFG)and their Ethiopian backers. In reality it is more complex. The latest fighting has been sparked by a government and Ethiopian push to disarm Somalia ahead of unification talks. Given Somalia's history of tribal violence and being ruled by the gun it is surely foolish for the government to expect the tribes to give up their arms before any unification agreements have been reached. This has made the insurgency more popular than it neccesarily would have been. The UIC is no doubt taking a big part in the violence against the government but perhaps an equal part is other clans fighting to hold on to their guns.

The TFG's leader and Somalia's president Abdullahi Yusuf is a member of the Darod clan. The other clans believe he is favouring the Darod economically and politically. The TFG is made up of many warlords from other tribes. As no unification agreements have been reached and the clansmen's loyalty is still with their clan before the TFG, there is division within the government. The saying goes: divide and conquer. The TFG's division would therefore explain why the relatively unified UIC took control of Somalia so easily.

It is a farce to expect rival warlords and clansmen cobbled together in Kenya as the TFG to govern Somalia without any unification, after years of inter-clan violence. The UIC is of course made up of rival clans but they have their extremist belief in the Islamic faith in common, giving them a unity which they have proven capable of governance.

Somalia's Prime Minister is a member of Mogadishu's most prominent, Hawiye clan. The same clan that most of the UIC come from. Hopes were raised of an end to the recent violence when it was reported that elders of the Hawiye clan had met with TFG and Ethiopian leaders and agreed a truce, whereby forces from both sides would withdraw from the front lines. Even if both sides kept to their agreement it would not have stopped the violence from any of the other clans, sub-clans or Hawiye members fighting with the UIC and therefore not under the ceasefire.

The violence stopped for a short period before resuming for a third day of heavy clashes. Hawiye sub-clans and/or militias, not consulted by the elders before agreeing the ceasefire and with competing interests are reported to have been responsible for the restart of fighting. The latest violence has killed around 24 people and hundreds have been wounded.

1500 Ugandan People's Defence Force troops are in Somalia as the first deployment of a planned 8000 African Union force. It is unclear when troops pledged by Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi and Burundi will be deployed. At any rate Somalis have a history of anger against foreign forces on their soil, as they showed with protests at the outset of the Ethiopian invasion.

Their feelings toward the foreign intervention were displayed again in Mogadishu Mar 21., as an angry mob of militiamen and civilians, including women burned the bodies of uniformed soldiers and dragged their corpses through the streets in barbaric jubilation. The scenes echoed the bodies of U.S. soldiers dragged through the Mogadishu streets in 1993 after their Black Hawk helicopter was shot down in a failed attempt to capture a warlord. Although reports said the bodies were of two Ethiopian and two TFG soldiers, neither the Ethiopian military nor the TFG have confirmed their troops were involved. However the African Union has said its troops were not active in the area.

The violence is not limited to the capital, according to a Relief Web report:

One car was destroyed and at least six people were injured March 18, when four cars transporting UN staff from Baidoa to Mogadishu overran a land mine near Afgoye checkpoint. It is not clear whether the explosion was targeted and no one was killed in the attack. The Mogadishu-Beletweyne road remains highly insecure due to sporadic ambushes. Several other roads remain unsafe, with a high number of roadblocks on the road from Lower and Middle Juba to Mogadishu.

In short, Somalia has returned to the lawlessness and violence it was suffering before the UIC uprising mid-2006.

The U.N. and U.S. have praised the TFG's scheduling of reconciliation talks for April 19. However, many of the UIC players considered vital for a solution remain in exile in Yemen and Europe. The powerful Ayr sub-clan, thought responsible for much of the UIC's military strength are also claiming they have been excluded from participating in the government, which is dominated by rival clans. With so many clans and sub-clans, so many conflicting interests, a history of failed negotiations, broken agreements and such deep rooted hatred for the government, it is unlikely reconciliation talks called for by the government will succeed, and if they do it is doubtful the agreements will be kept.

The UIC have proven they can stabilize and govern Somalia. The insurgency's growing popularity among Somalis proves the Somali people didn't resent the UIC's strict rule as much as they do the current government. Instead of reconciliation talks there should be a vote of the Somali people. Call it a referendum or an election, call it what you like but give them their say. It is the Somali people who have to live under the rule of their government and it is the Somali people who should decide what that government is. Certainly not people enjoying the absolute freedom of a long successful democracy.

Given that the only security Somalis have enjoyed was under the UIC it is likely they would vote their way. In that vote they would also be achieving what outside attempts to create a central government had in the Transitional National Government and its successor the TFG, a movement encompassing more than one Somali clan. Where they succeed over the failed attempts is the clans they encompass have the power to pacify Somalia.

The Somali people have suffered long enough. Their suffering should not be prolonged because their security infringes on a war that has nothing to do with them.

Talking Sense In Somalia: Let the Somali people have their say.

Liam Bailey

Thankfully someone is finally talking some sense in the Somalia crisis, some being the operative word. The Uganda Peoples' Defence Force spokesperson in Somalia is advocating the UIC be brought in and involved in talks to resolve the conflict. At last someone who realizes there won't be peace without all the warring parties agreement. However, the AU's best approach may be to give the Somali force the primary objective of enforcing and supervising the Islamic equivalent of democratic elections. A Muslim once told me that sharia law has to be agreed upon by everyone. The AU force should work to achieve a lasting mechanism whereby the people of Somalia can actually start having a say in how their country is run.

The world was shown the power of Islamic militancy in Somalia when the Union of Islamic Courts swept into a controlling position in a matter of months mid-2006. The group was immediately picked up by Bush's radar as part of the War on terror, because of its imposition of sharia law. Almost immediately the group was marred by allegations Al Qaeda members were being given safe haven there, mainly because the courts responsible for their sweep to power followed Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys' teachings of hard-line and western revered Salafist Islam. There was an internal battle between Awey's hard-line followers and the courts that followed Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed's more moderate teachings of Qutbism.

Most courts were quite hard-line and therefore, in the main the UIC's rule was extremely strict and harsh, but overall life was better for average Somalis than it had been for years. The UIC achieved a fifteen year first in bringing order and safety from the carnage and chaos left behind by the ousting of dictator Siad Barre. They did this however at the expense of varying degrees of social and religious freedoms, which certainly didn't suit everyone. Indeed the Somali people may eventually have decided to rise up against the UIC's possible misinterpretations of Sharia Law. At which times the moderates would have the power to awaken the suppressed rift within the group and destroy it from the inside giving Somalia a more moderate form of the governance most Somalis prefer, properly managed Sharia law. If they so chose.

They never got the chance. The UIC's power lasted only until December 2006 when they were forcibly driven out by advancing Ethiopian, Transitional Federal Government and U.S. special forces. Their rapid retreat laid fears in many analysts that they were living to fight another way. With the Iraq model sending fiery smoke signals to Islamic militancy all around the world, the UIC's obvious choice against the superior Ethiopian military and U.S. air strikes was to launch an insurgency from the shadows and hills.

That is all water under the bridge, we must now deal with the current situation. First of all, I admire Bush's --someone check my temperature-- restraint in sticking to air-strikes and a very small special forces contingent to assist their Ethiopian proxy in driving out the UIC, and utilizing the African Union to attempt to restore order. AU forces are far less likely to face a massive turn in public opinion against them, as the U.S. has in Iraq and would undoubtedly have in Somalia. The last U.S. led peacekeeping mission to Somalia in the 90's led to U.S. casualties and a hasty withdrawal. Whether or not Bush has left it to the AU because he needs all the forces he can get for an Iran attack remains to be seen.

Washington has now hired a military contractor, DynCorp International, to equip and otherwise support the AU Somalia mission. The AU has its work cut out from the Iraq model, and is already facing fierce fighting and casualties. Even with the private contract the AU mission has nowhere near the level of man power or firepower as the U.S is flailing wildly with inside Iraq, and if anything they face an often better armed and more organized force in the UIC. Under the watchful eye of Bush, and the empty expanse behind those eyes Somalia is quickly becoming Iraq II.

Therefore, there is no better way to bring Somalia back from the brink of catastrophic conflict than to give all Somalia's clans tribes and ordinary civilians a say in how their country is run and by whom. Whatever else the UIC can and has been accused of they are first and foremost Somali Muslims, with Somali families. The Union of Islamic Courts will fight to see Somalia governed by Islam. From the contact I have with Somali editors via e-mail, the UIC's sharia governance may well be accepted by the Somali population provided they have a say in the behavioural and religious codes being modernized to suit today's lifestyles and to all Somalis agreement.

The UIC is a strong and fairly unified movement, which has shown it is capable of restoring order to Somalia, whereas the TFG suffers from internal corruption and a lack of control over its forces. This was shown in their reign of power before the UIC uprising, gunmen hijacking food trucks and general lawlessness, bringing all sorts of misery for Somalis. If the AU were to enforce and supervise democratic elections and invite the UIC to join the elections it would almost certainly stop the fighting from their side, and therefore see an end to most of the violence.

Not only that, it would force the UIC to finally present a unified policy on how they will enforce sharia law and what behaviour they will and won't tolerate as well as likely punishments for infringements. Elections would also allow any other independents and their supporters to put forward their solutions to Somalia's many problems. Then it is up to the Somali people to decide. Maybe the best result for the Somalia population at large is a coalition government with all major voices represented, i.e. independents making slight but important changes to some of the UIC's more strict rules, or telling the TFG to get the gunmen off the streets between their daughters home and school. The AU contingent could hang around and make sure all voices continue to be heard and acted upon.

For the AU with limited resources enforcing such elections may be within their capabilities, supporting the warlord Transitional Federal Government at the bequest of Bush and the UN, as well as attempting to bring peace and security against a relentless insurgency at the same time is far outside the AU's capabilities, or anyone else's for that matter.

Are We Losing the War on Terror?

I wrote this article Oct. 4 2006, all articles I wrote before that can only be read at War Pages on Wordpress

Are We Losing the War on Terror

Has the level of threat changed since 9/11?

By Liam Bailey

In the aftermath of 9/11 the onslaught against Afghanistan was understandable given the atrocious attacks on the World Trade Center and the strong links with the terror networks and training camps there, which explains the relatively weak resistance to the war by the international community. Afghanistan has been a NATO concern, but because other NATO countries are reluctant to make an endless commitment of troops to a large counterinsurgency operation, it is mainly U.K. troops that have taken this responsibility. Iraq, however, is a different story.

Iraq has turned into a major concern for the U.S., Britain and the world. Not only has it replaced Afghanistan as the main haven for al-Qaeda's violent jihad, it is the ultimate example of the aggressive invasion and lengthy occupation of a Muslim country. That this should have been by the U.S., Islam's biggest enemy, completes the outrage. The U.K.'s involvement has made it Islamic enemy number two. Iraq quickly became a self-sufficient recruiting machine for terror networks, as well as the training and battleground for brainwashed jihadis worldwide.

During the Afghan war, indefinite, secret detention at Guantanamo, without charge or the right to a trial, started turning Muslims everywhere against U.S. and U.K. foreign policy, showing our governments' bigotry against Muslims purely on the basis of their appearance, religion and location. The thousands of innocent Iraqis killed as "collateral damage" in the shock and awe bombing campaign continued to turn Muslims against the U.S. and U.K., as did all the atrocities committed by U.S. forces, Abu Ghraib, Haditha, Fallujah, as well as who knows how many other smaller incidents.

The War on Terror has had some successes -- the U.S. Patriot Act abolished the bureaucratic prohibition on the sharing of intelligence among the various U.S. agencies at the front in the fight for homeland security. The removal of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan rid al-Qaeda of its state-based operational center, but the government installed by the U.S. has had to struggle against the warlords, and Taliban forces have reemerged. In Iraq, the defeat of Saddam Hussein by coalition forces rid the country and region of a vicious and cruel regime as well as eliminating a potential state sponsor of terrorism and a source of WMD. Continued instability, however, has made the country a breeding ground for extremism and anti-U.S./U.K. terrorism, as the recent report by 16 U.S. intelligence agencies showed.

The War on Terror has also led directly and indirectly to the capture or death of an estimated two-thirds of al-Qaeda's leadership, although its membership is estimated to have more than doubled from 20,000 in 2001 to the current 50,000. Little wonder then that the various countries involved in fighting the War on Terror alongside the U.S. have foiled some 15 serious terrorist attacks since 9/11. The War on Terror has also been successful in limiting the capabilities of al-Qaeda's leadership to communicate with its various cells and members around the world, so they can no longer safely use e-mail, mobile or satellite phones for fear of detection by the intelligence services; but they are still thought to be using anonymous internet chat rooms.

Despite these successes in the War on Terror there have been around 12 major terrorist attacks on Western interests, excluding attacks inside Iraq and Afghanistan. This is because the defeat of the Taliban and U.S. control of Afghanistan removed al-Qaeda's central base of operations. Almost immediately after 9/11 al-Qaeda became famous in most of the Muslim world and notorious throughout the non-Muslim world. The ensuing war in Afghanistan, the arguably illegal detention of Muslims at Guantanamo, the arguably illegal invasion of Iraq and subsequent pattern of atrocities committed by U.S. forces not only made it easier for the terror networks to radicalize and recruit but created a new threat of "self generating" terror cells. These have been radicalized by current events and inspired by al-Qaeda but are not part of the central chain of command, which makes it harder for our intelligence services to protect us from the expanding threat.

Perhaps the recent fertilizer plot was an example of this new threat, maybe Omar Khyam was in some way connected to al-Qaeda central command, but Jawad Akbar was the man coming up with all the plots and ideas. As we know from experience, if it was an al-Qaeda cell the targets would have been predisposed and the attack fully planned when the cell was alerted.

Although the number of terrorist attacks around the world fell from 426 in 2000 to 355 in 2001 and to 205 attacks in 2002, the jihadist propaganda inspired by the invasion of Afghanistan, then Guantanamo Bay, Iraq and support for Israel against Lebanon etc., has brought about a constant rise in terrorist attacks ever since. This is displayed in the U.S. annual patterns of terrorism reports, the 2003 patterns of global terrorism report contains, in the statistics section, a bar graph of the number of attacks each year from 1982-2003, which shows the number of attacks rising to 208 in 2003.

The biggest factor in the rise in terrorism, however, has been the Iraq war, according to the U.S. National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) statistics for 2004 the number of attacks rose dramatically to 651, attacks in Iraq also rose to 198 from 22 in 2003. NCTC figures for 2005 show an even more dramatic rise to 11,114 attacks, but the center had changed the way attacks were counted, so comparisons couldn't be made to previous years. The only way I could create such a comparison was to look at how terrorism was measured in 2004, the 2004 chronology by the NCTC counted only significant attacks, i.e., one or more fatalities or above $10,000 damage, fatalities or not, in figures for 2005 all attacks were counted, but in the statistics section a graph shows that the number of attacks involving one or more fatalities was 2,884, with attacks killing between two and four people at 1,614 in 2005. I therefore deem the comparable total for 2005 to be somewhere between the two figures.

Therefore, as our forces are still involved in heavy fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq and between the two war zones, fierce gun battles, allied and non-combatant deaths and terrorist attacks happening daily, the Afghan and Iraq invasions must surely be deemed mistakes in the fight against extremism in its current form for homeland and global security. Unfortunately, things are also going wrong at home.

Consider U.S. failures in the months before 9/11, when its intelligence agencies noted a surge in intercepted "chatter" about an impending al-Qaeda attack in the spring and summer of 2001. In July 2001, a Phoenix, AZ, FBI agent issued a memo warning of al-Qaeda operatives enrolled or enrolling in U.S. flight training schools, and in August 2001, Zacarias Massaoui was arrested at a Minneapolis flight school. He had been asking how to get into the cockpit of a 747, and his sole interest in learning to steer the plane after takeoff caught the attention of the flight trainers.

Cold-War budget cuts meant U.S. intelligence didn't have the translators or the staff to cope with the surge in "chatter", meaning it was largely just that, and for the same reason an antiquated computer system left FBI analysts unable to send e-mails or link up field reports, like the Phoenix memo and the details of Massaoui's arrest. Also, U.S. government rules prohibiting the sharing of information between criminal enquiries and counter-intelligence investigations meant that the CIA didn't tell the FBI for months that two terrorists were in the country, who, in hindsight, were two of the 19 hijackers. It is clear to me that a lack of resources played a part in 9/11, which became the catalyst for conflict as Bush went to war on Islamic terrorism, starting with Afghanistan and finishing -- no one knows when or where.

The Afghan war cost the U.S. government $18.1 billion in its first fiscal year (2001-02), according to CRS (Congressional Research Service) figures. The war went well in its infancy, as evident in the reduced cost for FY2003, lower by $1.1 billion. The Iraq war began at a cost of $51 billion in its first fiscal year. U.S. war spending on Afghanistan continued to drop in line with coalition success in the country, at $15.1 billion in FY 2004, while Iraq, costing $77.3 billion, began a continuous rise. In FY 2005, U.S. Iraq spending rose to $87.3 billion and, for the first time since the conflict started, the Afghan war costs rose to $18.1 billion. Costs of both wars continue to rise; in the latest figures released by the CRS for FY2006 Iraq cost the U.S. $100.4 billion and Afghanistan cost $19.9 billion.

U.K. forces have fought alongside the U.S. in both wars since they began. Funding for U.K.'s involvement in the War on Terror comes from the "special reserve," according to Iraq analysis, corroborated by The Times and The Guardian, this reserve has been constantly increasing since the initial £1 billion pledged in the pre-budget report for 2002. In the 2003 budget another £2 billion was secured for the special reserve to cover "the full costs of the U.K.'s military obligations" in Iraq. Another £800 million in the pre-budget report for 2004 released later in 2003 brought the total to £3.8 billion, which rose to £4.32 billion with the £520 million pledged in the pre-budget report in late 2004. Another £380 million was pledged in the 2005 budget, followed by £580 million in the pre-budget report for 2006 later in the year and a further £800 million in this year's budget, bringing the total to £6.44 billion. The Guardian reported in its coverage of U.K. war spending that Gordon Brown had pledged an additional £135 million for MI5 in late 2005. An announcement coming after 7/7, pledging a fraction of the money Iraq has cost, to the only people who had any chance of stopping them, can easily be seen as too little too late.

The U.K. government, like the U.S. government, is spending the biggest proportion of its defense budget on two foreign wars, both for homeland security, and like the U.S. all the while, mistakes are being made inside the U.K. in the same fight for homeland security.

Take the year before the atrocious attacks of the July 7, 2005. According to the ISC (Intelligence and Security Committee) report (p18 of 52) into those terrible attacks, also from The Guardian, Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer, two of the London bombers attended meetings with others under investigation by our security services in 2004. MI5 didn't seek to investigate or identify them or several other unidentified men at the meetings, although it is believed this would have been possible had the decision been taken to do so. This is because the man under investigation was not himself an "essential target," and U.K. intelligence at the time suggested the men's focus was training and insurgency operations in Pakistan. July 7 then lead to the mistaken shooting by the MET of Jean Charles De Menezes, and finally the joint failure of the MET and MI5, which led to one of the biggest media storm fiascos in the U.K.'s war against extremism, the Forest Gate raid.

So, who can say whether the money being spent on the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could have prevented these mistakes had it instead been funneled into U.K. police and intelligence agencies, but as a lack of resources was already a problem before 9/11, such high war costs can only have made things worse. The failure of MI5 to investigate two of the London bombers a year in advance was also put down to a lack of resources, and the many U.S. agencies that some senior military officials, like Gary Cheek, believe really hold the key to defeating terrorism also suffer from the same problem, so we can't help but connect this lack of resources where it matters, at home on both sides of the Atlantic, with the massive budget given to maintaining a war on two fronts, a war that after the early weeks began exacerbating the threat from global terrorism, while bearing a new "home-grown" or "self-generating" threat.

If our governments continue to take actions that unintentionally increase the risk, while the money spent on these actions weakens our defenses at home, one must wonder when the balance will be tipped in the terrorists' favor, if it hasn't been already.